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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates cointegrating relation between housing prices and economic 
fundamental variables in the US housing market.  Employing simple yet rigorous econometric 
techniques, the present paper finds strong evidence in favor of cointegrating relations in most US 
states when both the demand and supply side fundamental variables are included in the 
cointegrating regression.  This casts doubt on the previous empirical work that reported weak or 
no cointegrating relation of housing prices with mostly demand-side fundamental variables, 
which may have a misspecification problem.  Further, cointegrating vector estimates seem 
consistent with economic theories only when both side fundamental variables are used. 
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I. Introduction 
The present paper tests cointegration between housing prices and fundamentals in the US single 
family occupied housing market with a model that includes building cost as a supply shifter.  
Most of the conventional tests focus on the demand side of this relationship.  Other demand side 
fundamentals used as explanatory variables across states with annual data from 1975 to 2009 are 
real income per capita and population.  
The impact of building cost on housing prices is visible in the sample data.  Population 
has been growing steadily in all states.  Real income per capita has been increasing in nearly all 
of the states since the late 1970s.  Although real housing prices vary in most states, there has 
been a steady increase in almost all populous states starting from 1997.  This increase has been 
referred as a “bubble”.   In some of the populous states, bubble has averaged a lot more.  
Housing price increases averaged 11% in California, 9% in Florida, 7% in New York, 4% in 
Pennsylvania, 3.5% in Illinois, and 2% in Texas. 
The importance of the present study lies in finding cointegration from a single equation.  
However as Banarjee (1999) points out especially in small samples cointegration tests are 
considered to have relatively low test power.  The present study demonstrates that the issue of 
power may not be critical to finding cointegration rather it is a correctly specified model.  Gallin 
(2006) uses both univariate and more powerful panel-data tests for cointegration and rejects it, 
employing to construction wage as a supply shifter.  Wages are highly correlated with income, 
however, and may include only demand side information.  In addition, wages add little to the 
explanation and may hide the supply side information.  In the present study, we use a building 
cost index.  Building costs are assumed competitive between states.  This is more helpful in 
reflecting supply side information such as oil price movements than construction wages.  
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 Moreover the paper underlines the significance of obtaining the correct signs of the 
estimated coefficients from univariate cointegration tests.  Persistent movement among these 
cointegrating variables with correct signs then suggest that in the long run the housing market 
will reach a dynamic equilibrium and the relation among the states without cointegration is only 
bubbles. 
The sample is single family housing price.  Index is selected for the 50 states and DC.  
Annual data begin with the earliest available state data from 1975 and extend through 2009.  
Regarding the time horizon, Shiller and Perron (1985) argue more observations holding the time 
span fixed does not increase the power of tests.  Our results, therefore, should satisfy the reader 
in having a finite sample of 36 observations for this time series empirical study.   
Organization of the paper is as follows.  Section two is the literature review. In section 
two we explain the model and econometric methods for the cointegration.  Section four reports 
the regression results and interpretation.  Section five is the conclusion. 
II. Literature Review 
The previous studies (Abraham and Hendershott 1996, Capozza, Hendershott, Mack, and 
Mayer 2002, Meen 2002) indicate a common thought in the housing market that even if housing 
prices and income move in different directions in the short-run, the steady relationship between 
two variables will eventually push them toward their long-run equilibrium.  Most of the studies 
focus on finding cointegration by using powerful tests, panel regression or different sample sets.  
Further these studies have not mentioned the significance of obtaining correct signs in the 
coefficients of cointegrating variables.  Although the importance of building costs has been 
discussed slightly in the literature the correct definition as a supply shifter has not been explained 
sufficiently well.  There are many variables that contribute to building costs from land prices to 
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steel, and from transportation cost to labor cost.  If housing prices increase with general prices 
then real housing prices in the long-run are expected to be stationary. 1   
As Meen (2002) points out, in the short-run with inelastic housing supply, a positive 
demand shock will temporarily increase housing prices.  However, when prices go above the 
equilibrium, this relation will follow the change in the building cost levels.  Most of the 
following literature report cointegration only from demand side.  Malpezzi (1999) tests and 
formulates two-equation models of housing prices in many different ways and confirms that 
changes in housing prices are cointegrated with income.  Abraham and Hendershott (1996) 
estimate 30 MSAs and confirm cointegration between housing prices and income.  In an another 
MSA study, Mikhed and Zemick (2009) use several fundamental variables to explain housing 
prices and find that prior to 2006 there had been a price bubble.   Their univariate tests also 
indicate a decline in the prices for these MSAs.  Holly, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2006) find in 
their panel study for 49 states over 29 years that housing prices are cointegrated with 
fundamentals (real income).  Another study on dynamics of housing prices outside of US in 
Singapore by Hin and Cuervo (1999) find that there is a cointegration between housing prices 
and fundamentals such as real GDP and the prime lending rate.    
Capozza, Hendershott, Mack, and Mayer (2002) is the one of the few studies where 
supply shifter construction cost is used in a city-level panel study for 62 Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSA) in the US.  Authors test real housing price dynamics and find correlation with the 
fundamentals such as city size, real income growth, population growth, and real construction 
costs.   Galin (2006) is the only study where housing prices are not cointegrated with income in a 
city-level panel of 95 MSAs over 23 years.  The author states that even powerful tests are not 
significant enough to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. 
                                                          
1 Here Meen (2002) states that changes in house prices can be forecasted partly and they are not random walk. 
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The univariate regression results from state level sample in the present paper noticeably 
demonstrate that in the US housing market there is cointegration between house prices and 
fundamentals in some states when we incorporate both demand and supply shifters.  The 
approach in this study is confirming these results without relying on panel study which requires 
stronger assumptions.  We simply finalize the results by only single equation in all states.  
Furthermore our findings not only support cointegration in most states but also explain the 
significance of obtaining the correct signs in the equation.  However, there is no significant 
evidence when we employ only demand shifters income and population. 
III. The Housing Market Model 
The relationship of the housing price and fundamentals can be seen by analyzing housing 
supply and demand.  The proposed quantity of owner-occupied housing demand depends on the 
real price of house , real income per capita , population , and other stochastic demand 
shifters . The housing supply depends on the real price of house , building cost , population 
, and other stochastic supply shifters : 
  	 
           (1) 
  	 
          (2) 
The housing price and the quantity of house demanded can be written as a function of exogenous 
variables:  
  
           (3) 
Solution for the proposed model will be a log-linearized where the log of housing price is related 
to the logs of the rest of the derived variables.  Coefficients of this log-linearized model are 
assumed unchanged and other unobserved components of the model are assumed stationary.  
Housing price and fundamentals are cointegrated with unit roots. The relationship in (3) will 
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depend on the elasticities of supply and demand.  The idea will be testing for cointegration.  
There may be many reasons why such a cointegrating relationship may not exist.  Unstable price 
elasticities of supply, rapid changes in demographics may affect the price elasticity of demand or 
local taxes may not be stationary.  
A long-run equilibrium relationship between the housing prices and fundamentals such as 
income would require cointegration.  To elaborate the theory, we follow Poterba (1984) and 
Topel and Rosen (1988).  The model assumes housing is proportional to the stock of housing, 
indicated by .  The demand for housing can be shown as 
   
 ,        (4) 
where  is the rental rate for a unit of housing and   is a vector of demand shifters.  For 
simplicity assume that  follows a random walk: 
   
   
A straightforward approach to explain the structural model of the housing market is the present-
value model where the amount of rent should equal the user cost of housing.  Gallin (2006) 
suggests that if taxes, maintenance, and the risk premium are ignored one may write the housing 
price as 
   
 ,         (5)  
where  is the price of housing,  is the expectations operator conditional on information 
available at time  and  is the discounte rate.  Substituting (4) into (5) yields 
 
   ,         (6) 
According to Gallin (2006) in the short run if  is fixed then new investments can be written as 
    
 !  ",        (7) 
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where " is the vector of housing supply shifters.  The law of motion for capital  

#  $   , implies 
 

%&
'(
   
%
'(
",   (8) 
where  is the lag operator. 
We can show that a solution to (8) has real roots for reasonable values for   and!  
 
)*  +  ,",       (9) 
 
where  is the housing prices.  Assuming +# - . and ,# - . in (9) housing prices, 
demand shifters, and supply shifters are cointegrated in the model, if " elements have unit 
roots.  In other words, housing prices are cointegrated with stochastic demand shifters in .   
Based on this theory, we can continue with cointegration tests for state-level housing 
prices and fundamentals.  The hypothesized regression is 
  /0 
   $ 1 2/2324 5,      (10) 
where 6 
 #7 8 indexes  # variables and  
 # 7  9 indexes time.  If the residuals 5 
are stationary, then it can be concluded that the /’s are cointegrated.  We follow augmented 
Engle-Granger (AEG) : test for cointegration as in Engle and Granger (1987), a two-step 
procedure.  First estimated residuals 5; are obtained by estimating (10) with ordinary least 
squares.  The next step is to do an ADF : test on the residuals. 
IV. Empirical Results 
Real housing prices, real income per capita, and population for all states come from St. 
Louis FRED database.  Average national building cost is obtained from Robert J. Shiller’s 
website.  The building cost index mixes 20-city average steel, cement, and lumber prices as a 
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materials component, and includes 20-city average skilled and unskilled labor wages.  Over the 
sample period building cost index has an average of 84.5 and standard error of 1.23. 
** Table 1 ** 
Table 1 reports results of three different AEG : tests run for three different models.  In 
the first column income is the only explanatory variable.  Having only one variable, 
cointegration is confirmed only in five states, California, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, and South 
Dakota.  In the middle column, two demand shifter fundamentals income and population are 
incorporated.  Results do not change as expected with more demand shifters in the equation.  
California, DC, Iowa, Maryland, and South Dakota are the significant states with cointegration.  
No other state is reported as significant.  In the last column population is dropped and a supply 
shifter building cost is added with the demand shifter income to test the housing price and 
fundamentals relationship.  Results change dramatically compared to other one-variable and two-
variable models’ cointegration tests.  Cointegration is confirmed in twenty states, including 
populous states such as Arizona, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina. 
Canonical Cointegrating Regression (CCR) 
Park’s (1992) CCR method estimates the cointegrating vector, with a number of 
advantages.  The main idea of CCR is to implement least square estimation via transformed 
variables using the long-run covariance matrix of < 
  =>, so that the LS estimator is 
asymptotically efficient.  CCR is as efficient as the ML procedure of Johansen (1988) but is 
robust to distributional assumptions because it is nonparametric.2   
                                                          
2 Johansen Test was also employed for this study.  Cointegration is confirmed at least in one variable in 32 states 
only. 
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** Table 2 ** 
Table 2 reports the first model using CCR cointegration regression where housing price is 
a function of only one demand shifter, income.  CCR cointegration is displayed in H(p,q) column 
under the null hypothesis of cointegragtion.  Except in Arkansas, Iowa, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, and West Virginia cointegration is confirmed in almost all states.  However it is 
seen in the coefficient column that the demand shifter income is either insignificant in nine states 
or has the wrong sign in thirteen states.  This is not expected in this study regardless of the 
cointegration results.    
** Table 3 ** 
Table 3 reports the next model where two demand shifter income and population are 
employed.  On the contrary of the expectation of explaining the function with only demand side, 
cointegration is not confirmed in seventeen states.  Under the coefficient column in thirty eight 
states demand shifters both or separately has the wrong signs.  Populous states like Pennsylvania, 
Georgia, Michigan, and Illinois are some of the examples.  While one expects to see income per 
capita to have positive sign in model 2 but in these states it has negative sign although 
cointegration is confirmed.  Some information is still hidden in this model when two demand 
shifters are used. 
** Table 4 ** 
Finally in the last table we employ one demand shifter income and one supply shifter 
building cost in explaining house prices.  The results again change dramatically in this model as 
with the Augmented Engle Granger test.  Cointegration is confirmed for almost all states except 
in California, Michigan, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin.  Also coefficients are now 
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significant and have the correct signs for the most states.  Failing to confirm cointegration 
especially in California and Texas is expected because of the large housing markets in 
metropolitan cities Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, and Dallas.  This evidently suggests 
bubbles in housing market.  However without relying on panel study which requires stronger 
assumptions, the model as a whole explains this hidden information by including building cost in 
a single equation for each state.  
V. Conclusion 
Choosing the right supply and demand shifters is a critical part of the study of housing 
market dynamics.  In order to reflect more supply information, the current study incorporates 
building cost to test the relationship between housing prices and fundamentals in the US single 
family housing market at the state level.  This study confirms that housing prices and 
fundamentals are linked by a long-run equilibrium relationship in most states.  Cointegration is 
tested with Augmented Engle Granger and canonical cointegrating regression test for the 
analysis in three different models for each of the states.  
There is no significant evidence to support cointegration when only demand shifters are 
employed in the housing market model.  The present paper reveals that even with low power 
univariate regression methods there is cointegration between housing prices and fundamentals in 
most states when both supply and demand shifters are incorporated.  The previous literature has 
been improved with deterministic and correctly specified work by using a finite small sample.  
Persistent movements among variables have provided much stronger cointegration results 
determined by the fundamentals. 
  When the model including both demand and supply shifters is specified more correctly, 
cointegration is confirmed in most states.  In the states such as California, Michigan, South 
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Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin with no cointegration, the relationship between housing prices 
and fundamentals are nothing but bubbles.  The present paper also suggests that the housing 
market will eventually reach equilibrium in the long run. 
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Table – 1 Augmented Engle/Granger Univariate Cointegration Test Results 
                                     ADF Test Statistics                                ADF Test Statistics 
 STATES Y Y-POP Y-BC STATES Y Y-POP Y-BC 
Alabama -1.17 -1.28 -4.97*** Montana -2.77 -2.97 -4.13** 
Alaska -3.10 -3.11 -3.27 North Carolina -1.16 -3.45 -4.36** 
Arkansas -1.25 -2.18 -4.49** North Dakota -1.23 -1.79 -5.44*** 
Arizona -1.82 -1.51 -3.93* Nebraska -1.22 -2.08 -2.28 
California -3.52** -3.68* -3.51 Nevada -3.00 -2.65 -3.38 
Colorado -1.62 -1.62 -3.73* New Hampshire -2.54 -2.40 -2.78 
Connecticut -2.46 -2.72 -2.43 New Jersey -2.76 -2.75 -2.76 
Delaware -2.37 -2.82 -3.08 New Mexico -1.84 -2.02 -2.60 
D.C. -3.03 -3.94* -2.84 New York -2.21 -2.16 -2.39 
Florida -2.91 -2.04 -4.08** Ohio  -1.96 -3.06 -2.28 
Georgia -0.62 -2.36 -3.91* Oklahoma -1.51 -1.82 -2.94 
Hawaii -3.80** -3.82* -3.77* Oregon -1.90 -2.01 -3.30 
Idaho -1.15 -1.24 -3.96* Pennsylvania -2.52 -2.76 -2.95 
Illinois -1.56 -2.60 -2.83 Rhode Island -2.94 -3.02 -2.65 
Indiana -1.64 -2.28 -2.94 South Carolina -1.52 -2.80 -3.33 
Iowa -2.63 -4.13** -2.21 South Dakota -3.97** -4.52** -7.11*** 
Kansas -1.89 -1.46 -2.61 Tennessee -1.35 -2.90 -4.83*** 
Kentucky -1.49 -2.11 -4.82*** Texas -1.52 -1.49 -2.02 
Louisiana -1.70 -1.74 -3.05 Utah -1.97 -1.90 -3.76* 
Maine -3.29* -3.30 -3.06 Virginia -2.24 -2.14 -3.21 
Maryland -3.87** -3.91* -3.55 Vermont -1.79 -2.29 -2.56 
Massachusetts -3.03 -3.04 -3.05 Washington -2.39 -2.39 -2.92 
Michigan -2.60 -2.84 -3.95* Wisconsin -1.76 -1.75 -4.15** 
Minnesota -1.49 -1.98 -3.20 West Virginia -1.07 -2.49 -3.66* 
Missouri -1.34 -3.13 -4.41** Wyoming -1.56 -1.56 -3.52 
Mississippi -1.10 -1.23 -5.37***         
 
Notes:  Critical Values for 35 sample-size are calculated from MacKinnon (2010); for 2 variables 
-4.228, -3.516, -3.168, for 3 variables -4.732, -3.994, -3.633, for 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table – 2 Model 1 CCR Results (1-inp) 
CCR Cointegration Results 
  Coeff. (St. Err.) H(p,q)   Coeff. (St. Err.) H(p,q)  
 STATES Model 1 Stat (p-value) STATES Model 1 Stat (p-value) 
Alabama -0.14(0.19) 1.60(0.21)*** Montana 1.59(0.49) 0.15(0.70) *** 
Alaska 2.24(0.31) 0.24(0.63)*** North Carolina 0.34(0.04) 0.06(0.80) *** 
Arkansas -0.36(0.34) 4.26(0.04) North Dakota 0.73(0.45) 2.56(0.11) *** 
Arizona 0.10(0.55) 0.52(0.47)*** Nebraska 0.13(0.42) 2.47(0.12) *** 
California 2.15(0.17) 0.46(0.50)*** Nevada 0.59(0.29) 0.55(0.46) *** 
Colorado 0.79(0.28) 1.05(0.31)*** New Hampshire 0.33(0.17) 1.48(0.22) *** 
Connecticut 0.53(0.46) 0.56(0.45)*** New Jersey 0.90(0.26) 0.13(0.72) *** 
Delaware 1.09(0.25) 0.05(0.82) *** New Mexico 0.50(0.52) 0.41(0.52) *** 
DC 1.55(0.62) 0.58(0.45) *** New York 1.83(0.36) 1.81(0.18) *** 
Florida -0.07(0.27) 1.41(0.24) *** Ohio  -0.14(0.31) 2.43(0.12) *** 
Georgia 0.30(0.04) 1.46(0.23) *** Oklahoma -0.70(1.51) 3.94(0.05) 
Hawaii 2.80(0.43) 0.68(0.41) *** Oregon 1.81(0.09) 0.65(0.42) *** 
Idaho 0.58(0.14) 0.05(0.81) *** Pennsylvania 0.70(0.33) 0.00(0.95) *** 
Illinois 0.85(0.17) 0.03(0.87) *** Rhode Island 1.27(0.25) 1.16(0.28) *** 
Indiana -0.05(0.17) 0.48(0.49) *** South Carolina 0.39(0.00) 0.86(0.35) *** 
Iowa 0.20(0.97) 6.40(0.01) South Dakota 0.53(0.15) 4.22(0.04) 
Kansas -0.40(0.97) 2.27(0.13) *** Tennessee -0.05(0.15) 2.52(0.11) *** 
Kentucky 0.20(0.26) 0.73(0.39) *** Texas -1.13(0.44) 0.03(0.87) *** 
Louisiana -0.35(0.56) 1.16(0.28) *** Utah 0.67(0.40) 0.83(0.36) *** 
Maine 0.94(0.23) 0.00(0.97) *** Virginia 0.63(0.10) 0.06(0.81) *** 
Maryland 0.92(0.12) 0.00(0.98) *** Vermont 0.57(0.21) 0.15(0.70) *** 
Massachusetts 1.14(0.23) 0.50(0.48) *** Washington 1.61(0.19) 0.03(0.86) *** 
Michigan 0.91(0.20) 0.02(0.89) *** Wisconsin 0.75(0.37) 0.10(0.75) *** 
Minnesota 0.65(0.16) 0.14(0.71) *** West Virginia -0.13(0.68) 3.05(0.08) 
Missouri -0.16(0.21) 10.06(0.00) Wyoming 0.65(0.58) 1.88(0.17) *** 
Mississippi -0.37(0.35) 0.20(0.65) ***       
 
Notes: Stat and p-values in H(p,q) column with three asterisks indicate significant critical values 
for the corresponding states. (Under the null hypothesis of cointegration p-values > 10% are 
significant) 
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Table – 3 Model 2 CCR Results (2-inp) 
CCR Cointegration Results CCR Cointegration Results 
  Coeff. (St. Err.) H(p,q)    Coeff. (St. Err.) H(p,q)  
 STATES Y POP Stat (p-value)  STATES Y POP Stat (p-value) 
Alabama -2.17(0.89) 5.35(2.21) 1.32(0.25)*** Montana 2.77(0.54) -2.76(0.94) 10.14(0.00) 
Alaska 2.25(0.24) 0.18(0.08) 0.00(0.95) *** North Carolina -1.12(0.18) 1.50(0.18) 1.30(0.26) *** 
Arkansas -3.78(0.83) 6.58(1.54) 0.01(0.93) *** North Dakota 0.53(0.41) 2.58(2.15) 4.99(0.03) 
Arizona 2.69(0.41) -0.83(0.40) 0.09(0.77) *** Nebraska -2.58(0.68) 8.54(2.23) 10.86(0.00) 
California 0.84(0.37) 0.53(0.29) 1.44(0.23) *** Nevada 2.06(0.39) -0.42(0.10) 5.59(0.02) 
Colorado 3.54(0.85) -2.36(0.82) 3.37(0.07) New Hampshire 4.12(1.36) -5.81(2.36) 5.50(0.02) 
Connecticut -0.91(0.74) 10.23(3.66) 0.06(0.81) *** New Jersey 2.12(0.22) -1.43(0.68) 1.68(0.20) *** 
Delaware 0.72(0.74) 0.23(0.85) 0.70(0.40) *** New Mexico 2.78(0.66) -2.14(0.59) 0.97(0.33) *** 
DC 1.88(0.20) 2.59(0.54) 0.38(0.54) *** New York 1.99(0.26) 0.41(1.41) 0.06(0.81) *** 
Florida 6.54(1.17) -4.05(0.94) 7.08(0.01) Ohio  -1.42(0.36) 6.94(1.58) 5.05(0.03) 
Georgia -1.00(0.36) 0.92(0.32) 2.21(0.14) *** Oklahoma 1.40(0.73) -2.94(1.20) 15.43(0.00) 
Hawaii 3.51(0.55) -0.14(0.48) 0.22(0.64) *** Oregon 1.68(1.01) -0.50(1.46) 0.13(0.72) *** 
Idaho 0.58(0.91) -0.04(0.70) 0.24(0.63) *** Pennsylvania -0.49(0.40) 7.56(3.05) 0.02(0.88) *** 
Illinois -0.20(0.49) 2.99(1.57) 0.64(0.42) *** Rhode Island 0.69(0.50) 2.91(1.64) 0.00(0.97) *** 
Indiana -1.02(0.49) 2.19(1.09) 0.02(0.88) *** South Carolina -1.81(0.36) 2.62(0.47) 0.70(0.40) *** 
Iowa -0.69(0.17) 7.27(0.79) 10.37(0.00) South Dakota -0.29(0.53) 3.02(1.95) 4.82(0.03) 
Kansas 6.24(1.07) -13.20(2.27) 3.09(0.08) Tennessee -1.73(0.48) 2.99(0.71) 5.58(0.02) 
Kentucky -1.09(0.39) 3.40(0.98) 1.36(0.24) *** Texas 2.57(0.61) -2.24(0.48) 2.07(0.15) *** 
Louisiana 0.52(0.53) -0.10(1.03) 2.31(0.13) *** Utah 2.42(0.80) -0.88(0.54) 0.54(0.46) *** 
Maine 2.03(1.22) -3.23(3.65) 0.23(0.63) *** Virginia 1.58(0.09) -1.16(0.33) 1.65(0.20) *** 
Maryland 1.28(0.55) -0.33(0.93) 1.44(0.23) *** Vermont 2.74(0.41) -5.43(1.03) 1.02(0.31) *** 
Massachusetts 2.18(0.14) 0.04(1.16) 1.22(0.27) *** Washington 1.80(0.89) -0.21(0.85) 0.28(0.59) *** 
Michigan -1.38(0.39) 6.25(0.96) 0.11(0.74) *** Wisconsin 1.45(1.11) -0.71(2.35) 0.43(0.51) *** 
Minnesota -0.05(1.11) 1.65(2.06) 7.22(0.01) West Virginia 0.93(0.12) 7.12(0.45) 4.34(0.04) 
Missouri -2.18(0.57) 4.46(1.15) 3.11(0.08) Wyoming 0.88(0.23) -0.94(0.40) 3.48(0.06) 
Mississippi -0.90(1.19) 1.78(3.61) 0.97(0.33) ***         
 
Notes: Stat and p-values in H(p,q) column with three asterisks indicate significant critical values 
for the corresponding states. (Under the null hypothesis of cointegration p-values > 10% are 
significant) 
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Table – 4 Model 3 CCR Results (2-inp S & D) 
CCR Cointegration Results CCR Cointegration Results 
  Coeff. (St. Err.) H(p,q)    Coeff. (St. Err.) H(p,q)  
 STATES Y BC Stat (p-value)  STATES Y BC Stat (p-value) 
Alabama 0.66(0.04) 1.49(0.09) 0.26(0.61) *** Montana 1.41(0.21) 0.86(0.29) 0.49(0.48) *** 
Alaska 1.87(0.42) 0.30(0.34) 0.00(0.95) *** North Carolina 0.82(0.04) 1.25(0.08) 0.01(0.94) *** 
Arkansas 0.50(0.06) 1.55(0.12) 0.10(0.76) *** North Dakota 0.54(0.05) 2.17(0.09) 0.74(0.39) *** 
Arizona 1.72(0.21) 1.98(0.36) 0.07(0.79) *** Nebraska 0.63(0.22) 1.71(0.41) 0.00(0.99) *** 
California 1.90(0.13) -0.15(0.25) 5.19(0.02) Nevada 0.55(0.48) 0.52(0.64) 1.16(0.28) *** 
Colorado 2.12(0.23) 2.46(0.42) 0.32(0.57) *** New Hampshire 0.14(0.46) -0.08(0.86) 0.50(0.48) *** 
Connecticut 1.17(0.63) 0.20(1.27) 0.03(0.86) *** New Jersey 2.07(0.97) 1.77(2.19) 0.08(0.78) *** 
Delaware 0.93(0.36) 0.07(0.48) 0.01(0.92) *** New Mexico 0.93(0.14) 1.28(0.23) 0.17(0.68) *** 
DC 2.35(0.30) 3.71(0.80) 0.01(0.93) *** New York 2.74(0.52) 2.08(0.97) 0.75(0.39) *** 
Florida 1.82(0.22) 2.90(0.40) 1.17(0.28) *** Ohio  -0.01(0.23) 0.53(0.15) 1.55(0.21) *** 
Georgia 0.98(0.10) 1.79(0.24) 0.08(0.77) *** Oklahoma 0.75(0.20) 2.53(0.29) 0.19(0.66) *** 
Hawaii 3.02(0.47) 0.41(0.61) 1.27(0.26) *** Oregon 2.08(0.22) 1.34(0.34) 0.43(0.51) *** 
Idaho 1.16(0.06) 1.50(0.12) 0.80(0.37) *** Pennsylvania 0.09(0.45) -0.11(0.29) 0.01(0.93) *** 
Illinois 0.86(0.14) 0.65(0.09) 1.46(0.23) *** Rhode Island 1.04(0.51) -0.36(0.96) 0.31(0.58) *** 
Indiana 0.23(0.12) 0.39(0.19) 1.62(0.20) *** South Carolina 0.89(0.05) 1.39(0.11) 0.16(0.69) *** 
Iowa 0.90(0.28) 2.07(0.38) 0.11(0.75) *** South Dakota 0.85(0.08) 1.16(0.16) 3.69(0.06) 
Kansas 0.65(0.16) 1.99(0.26) 0.04(0.85) *** Tennessee 0.88(0.05) 1.60(0.11) 0.03(0.87) *** 
Kentucky 0.73(0.07) 1.01(0.13) 1.95(0.16) *** Texas 0.33(0.14) 1.91(0.22) 3.32(0.07) 
Louisiana 0.80(0.12) 2.30(0.23) 0.19(0.66) *** Utah 2.01(0.22) 2.13(0.38) 1.16(0.28) *** 
Maine 1.12(0.29) 0.22(0.64) 0.02(0.90) *** Virginia 0.92(0.17) 1.06(0.18) 0.00(0.99) *** 
Maryland 1.30(0.23) 0.97(0.35) 0.42(0.52) *** Vermont 0.69(0.21) 0.68(0.43) 0.05(0.82) *** 
Massachusetts 1.86(1.08) 1.08(2.60) 0.11(0.75) *** Washington 1.43(0.23) 0.00(0.42) 0.43(0.51) *** 
Michigan 1.36(0.22) 0.63(0.32) 4.00(0.05) Wisconsin 1.44(0.10) 1.42(0.17) 2.98(0.08) 
Minnesota 1.24(0.12) 1.63(0.27) 0.11(0.74) *** West Virginia 0.65(0.09) 2.12(0.14) 2.04(0.15) *** 
Missouri 0.76(0.07) 1.21(0.11) 0.54(0.46) *** Wyoming 0.88(0.13) 2.11(0.26) 0.23(0.63) *** 
Mississippi 0.53(0.08) 1.87(0.17) 1.84(0.18) ***         
 
Notes: Stat and p-values in H(p,q) column with three asterisks indicate significant critical values 
for the corresponding states. (Under the null hypothesis of cointegration p-values > 10% are 
significant)  
 
